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The current work investigates the inﬂuence of acute stress onmindwandering. Participants
completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule as a measure of baseline negative
mood, and were randomly assigned to either the high-stress or low-stress version of the
Trier Social Stress Test. Participants then completed the Sustained Attention to Response
Task as a measure of mind-wandering behavior. In Experiment 1, participants reporting
a high degree of negative mood that were exposed to the high-stress condition were
more likely to engage in a variable response time, make more errors, and were more
likely to report thinking about the stressor relative to participants that report a low level of
negative mood. These effects diminished throughout task performance, suggesting that
acute stress induces a temporary mind-wandering state in participants with a negative
mood. The temporary affect-dependent deﬁcits observed in Experiment 1 were replicated
in Experiment 2, with the high negative mood participants demonstrating limited resource
availability (indicated by pupil diameter) immediately following stress induction. These
experiments provide novel evidence to suggest that acute psychosocial stress brieﬂy
suppresses the availability of cognitive resources and promotes an internally oriented focus
of attention in participants with a negative mood.
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INTRODUCTION
The experience of stress is pervasive. In 2011, 23.6%of adult Cana-
dians reported experiencing extreme stress in daily life (Statistics
Canada, 2011). With chronic stress linked to immunological (e.g.,
Herbert and Cohen, 1993; Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1996; Cohen et al.,
2001; Esch et al., 2002a; Segerstrom and Miller, 2004, for reviews),
cardiovascular (e.g., Harlan, 1981; Esch et al., 2002b; Bunker et al.,
2003), and neurodegenerative disease (e.g., Gilad et al., 1990; Gilad
and Gilad, 1995), as well as poor mental health (e.g., Negrão et al.,
2000; Vaidya, 2000; Raison and Miller, 2003), an abundance of
research has emerged with the aim of mapping both the psycho-
logical and physiological determinants of the body’s response to
stress.
Transactional models of stress (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984)
are multidimensional representations that emphasize the recip-
rocal relation between state and stressor on behavior. Trans-
actional models provide an algorithm that characterizes stress
response based on an individual’s appraisal of environmental
demands and subsequent choice of coping strategy (Lazarus,
1966, 1999; Stokes and Kite, 1994, 2000; Zeidner and Endler,
1996; Hammond, 2000). Appraisal mechanisms evaluate the
degree of personal relevance within the stressful context, while
coping mechanisms regulate whether the individual engages in
either a task-focused or emotion-focused strategy (Lazarus and
Folkman, 1984). A task-focused coping strategy operates to
prevent distraction and maintain successful task performance.
An emotion-focused coping strategy is intimately tied to self-
regulation and self-referential mentation, and facilitates the
prioritization of processing internal worries at the expense of
concurrent task performance (e.g., Matthews and Desmond,
2002).
While transactional models provide a framework for develop-
ing a state-mediated model of stress, transactional theories lack
speciﬁc predictions on information processing (Matthews and
Campbell, 2009). Matthews (2001) proposed two separate trans-
actional frameworks formodeling the effects of stress on cognition
in order to address this gap in the literature. Cognitive-adaptive
transactions aim to model the stress response as a function of the
allocation of attention and energy, where behavior is driven by
goals and intentions and operates to direct attention as a func-
tion of coping strategy. Those who enlist a task-focused coping
strategy are therefore more likely to allocate attention toward task
supervision in efforts to maintain successful task performance,
while those who enlist and an emotion-focused coping strategy
are more likely to allocate attention toward self-referential men-
tation (and therefore are more likely to perform poorly on the
task). This framework aligns with previous reports that stress
promotes the select processing of information relevant to an indi-
viduals’ current goal state (Chajut andAlgom, 2003; Kofman et al.,
2006). Bio-cognitive transactions on the other hand, are modu-
lated by ﬂuctuations in both neural and cognitive architectures
that directly inﬂuence the availability of attentional resources,
where the term resources refers to the capacity of the executive
attention network to process information (see Kane and Engle,
2002). Indeed, stress has been shown to deplete working memory
capacity independent of task difﬁculty (Schoofs et al., 2008) and
modulate cognitive control functioning (Alexander et al., 2007;
Steinhauser et al., 2007; Liston et al., 2009). The two conceptual
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frameworks are therefore inherently linked and complementary:
bio-cognitive transactions model the limitation of attentional
resources during periods of stress, while cognitive-adaptive trans-
actions model the allocation of attention within the constraints
of resource availability. The current work aims to investigate
the effect of stress on mind-wandering behavior, using both
a cognitive-adaptive (Experiment 1) and bio-cognitive (Experi-
ment 2) parameters to provide a comprehensive account of the
effects.
In the situation of an emotion-focused coping strategy, atten-
tion is allocated toward the internalworld rather than the task envi-
ronment. Often referred to as mind-wandering episodes (Small-
wood et al., 2003a,c; for a review, see Smallwood and Schooler,
2006), these mental diversions are associated with poor task
performance (see Smallwood and Schooler, 2006) and typically
occur during well-practiced or mundane tasks (e.g., Teasdale et al.,
1995). While mind-wandering behavior consumes almost half of
our conscious experience in daily life (Killingsworth and Gilbert,
2010), such behavior occurs more frequently in some populations
relative to others. For example, clinically depressed (e.g., Carriere
et al., 2008) and dysphoric populations (Smallwood et al., 2007)
are more likely to engage in mind-wandering behavior compared
to healthy controls. A similar bias toward internal processing has
been observed following negative mood induction in healthy indi-
viduals. Smallwood et al. (2009) found that participants induced
with a negative mood were more likely to engage in task-irrelevant
thought and were less able to effectively disengage from such
thoughts relative to controls. Smallwood and O’Connor (2011)
observed a similar increase inmind-wandering behavior following
negative mood induction, and report a retrospective bias during
episodes of off-task thought in the negativemood group relative to
controls.
Negative mood has also been implicated as a critical deter-
minant of coping strategy in studies of stress (Parker and Brown,
1982). Coyne et al. (1981) compared coping mechanisms in stress-
ful situations between depressed and non-depressed populations
over a 1-year period. Using self-report as the primary measure,
the authors report that being in a depressive state promotes an
emotion-focused coping following a stressful experience. Depres-
sive states have also been associated with a heightened perception
of what is at stake in a stressful situation (e.g., self-esteem and
well-being) relative to controls (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984), and
is associated with fewer available personal and social resources to
mediate the effects of stress (Mitchell et al., 1983).
Negative mood appears to systematically bias the allocation
of attention toward a self-referential mentation within both the
mind wandering and stress literature. The current work there-
fore attempts to provide novel evidence for a cognitive-adaptive
(Experiment 1) and bio-cognitive (Experiment 2) account of stress
on mind-wandering behavior, with negative mood isolated as the
state variable within the transactional framework. We grouped
participants based on their level of state negative mood, and
exposed them to either a high-stress procedure or a low stress con-
trol procedure. In Experiment 1, we predicted that in the high
negative mood group, the high-stress condition would induce
an emotion-focused coping strategy and an allocation of atten-
tion toward the internal environment, resulting in an increase
in mind-wandering behavior relative to the low stress condition.
In Experiment 2, we aimed to replicate the behavioral effects of
Experiment 1, and predict a limitation of resource availability
(indicated by larger pupil diameter; Beatty, 1982) following par-
ticipation in the high-stress condition for the high negative mood
group relative to the low stress condition. Finally, the effect of
stress on cognition has been shown to diminish over time (Elzinga
and Roelofs, 2005; Oei et al., 2006), and as such we predict that
stress effects are likely to be maximal immediately after stress
induction (block 1) in both experiments. As a most direct test
of these hypotheses, we used planned comparisons based on a
priori predictions of high-stress experiences affecting high neg-
ative affect more adversely than low negative affect participants,
immediately following stress induction, in addition to omnibus
tests.
EXPERIMENT 1
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants (n = 124; 51 in the experimental group, 26 females;
and 73 in the control group, 43 females) were undergraduate stu-
dents fromMcMasterUniversity. Participants were recruited using
the University’s online experiment scheduling system and received
partial course credit in exchange for their participation.
Procedure
Participants spent approximately 1 h in the laboratory. After
providing written informed consent, participants were asked to
complete the Extended Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS-X; Watson et al., 1988). The PANAS-X provides a sub-
scale measure of an individual’s level of state positive and negative
mood, and was used as a baseline measure of state mood prior to
the stress induction procedure. In the current work, our predic-
tions were inclusive to participants’ scores on the negative subscale
only. As a result, participants’ scores on the positive subscale were
not included in the analyses.
Participants then randomly assigned to either the “high-stress”
experimental condition (Kirschbaum et al., 1993) or the “low
stress” control condition (Het et al., 2009) of the Trier Social Stress
Test (TSST), a standardized paradigm that reliably activates the
body’s stress response (Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004; Kuhlmann
and Wolf, 2005). Both conditions had two phases. The ﬁrst phase
included an anticipation period, where participants were asked to
sit in a waiting room alone for 5 min. This ﬁrst phase was the same
for both conditions. In the second phase, participants were moved
into a second experiment room. In the high-stress condition, par-
ticipants were required to complete complex verbal arithmetic and
to give an impromptu speech (on their career plan following com-
pletion of their undergraduate degree) in front of a three-member
confederate panel. Participants were informed that their perfor-
mance was being taped for further consideration. In the low stress
condition, participants were required to count aloud in intervals
of 15 without a panel for the verbal arithmetic task, and infor-
mally talk about their favorite movie or experience in front of a
single panel member for the speech task (as per Kirschbaum et al.,
1993).
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Participants were then guided to another experiment room
where they completed the Sustained Attention to Response Task
(SART; Robertson et al., 1997) as a measure of mind-wandering
propensity. The SART is a go/no-go task that requires partic-
ipants to respond quickly and accurately on non-target trials,
and withhold their response on infrequent target trials. In the
current work, target probability was 20%, with the non-target
stimuli being the numbers 0 through 9 and the target stimulus
being the number 3 (for a review, see Smallwood and Schooler,
2006). Probe trials immediately followed target trials to assess
the participants’ conscious experience of mind-wandering behav-
ior. The probe read “Stop! Where was your attention focused
immediately prior to this question?” with an alternative forced
choice response format of either “my attention was focused on
the task” or “my attention was not focused on the task.” The
proportion of off-task thought was calculated by dividing the
number of off-task thought probes by the total number of thought
probes (Vinski and Watter, 2012). The experiment was pre-
sented to participants using E-prime software (Schneider et al.,
2002). Participants were shown two blocks of 179 stimuli, with
stimuli presented for 700 ms and an inter-stimulus interval of
2000 ms. The stimuli were presented in black print on a white
background.
Response time variability on non-target trials, known as the
response time coefﬁcient of variability (RTCV, calculated as reac-
tion time SD divided by the mean), and the proportion of
inappropriate responding on target trials (error rate) were cal-
culated as the behavioral indicators of task inattention (see
Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). Response time variability has
been validated as a measure of natural variation in attentional
focus throughout task performance andhas emerged as an increas-
ingly relevant behavioral measure within the mind wandering
literature (Cheyne et al., 2009). Error rate is indicative of fail-
ures in top-down supervision of task performance (Robertson
et al., 1997; Manly et al., 1999), and has traditionally been utilized
as a measure of off-task focus (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006;
Smallwood et al., 2007). However, convergent evidence suggests
that not all performance errors provide direct evidence of inatten-
tion (e.g., Peebles and Bothell, 2004; Helton, 2009), with error
rates mediated by both signal salience and the speed-accuracy
trade off (See et al., 1995; Manly et al., 1999) and vulnerable
to impulsivity (e.g., Helton, 2009). Correlations were therefore
computed between dependent measures for the ﬁrst block of the
experiment and across all experimental blocks to validate that the
three dependent measures reﬂect the same construct. Correla-
tions are shown in Table 2. The proportion of times participants
failed to respond on non-target trials, typically referred to as
the omission rate (Cheyne et al., 2009), was not included as a
dependent measure due to the limited time in which partici-
pants were required to make their response on non-target trials
(700 ms).
Retrospective probes were inserted following the ﬁrst and
second experimental block to provide a measure of thought
content during mind-wandering episodes. Retrospective report
of off-task thought has been validated with both intermittent
thought probes and response latencies during task performance
(Smallwood et al., 2004), and therefore provides an opportunity
to collect an additional measure of attentional focus during task
performance. Participants were given 3 min to type the content of
their thoughts during the experimental block immediately prior.
Participants were reassured that the report would be conﬁdential
and were encouraged to be as detailed in their report as possi-
ble. Thought content was coded based on three parameters: tense,
valence, and focus. Tense refers to whether participants’ thoughts
were focused on episodes that occurred prior to the experimen-
tal session (past), episodes that occurred within the experimental
session (present), or expectation of future episodes (future; mod-
iﬁed from criterion deﬁned by Smallwood et al., 2011b). Valence
refers to the affective tone of participants’ thoughts. Content was
coded as either positive, negative, neutral, or a select combination
of either affective valence. Focus refers to the focus of participants’
thoughts with respect to the experimental paradigm. Content
was coded as either related to the SART (task-related), to their
experience during the TSST (TSST-related) or unrelated to the
experimental session (task-unrelated; see Smallwood et al., 2003b
for a similar coding criterion). If participants reported thoughts
that coincided with more than one level of a given factor (for
example, reported both positive and negative thoughts within the
same retrospective probe) then the participant was classiﬁed as
“Other.”
Two assistants in the laboratory were recruited to code the
thought probes, and were extensively debriefed on the coding
scheme prior to completing the classiﬁcation. A cross-coding val-
idation procedure was employed to validate the categorization of
the participants’ retrospective reports, whereby the two coders
compared classiﬁcation for each subject (as per Smallwood et al.,
2003a). Discrepancies between coders were resolved through dis-
cussion, and a third party was included if the case of indecision.
In the current work, all discrepancies were resolved through dis-
cussion and no third party mediation was necessary. Coders were
blind to the experimental hypotheses and participant information.
Participants were extensively debriefed following participation.
RESULTS
The ﬁrst set of analyses were designed to investigate the effects
of stress on mind-wandering behavior across task duration, as
a function of negative mood reported prior to stress induction.
Behavioral (response time variability and error rate) and expe-
rience sampling data (self-report probes) were analyzed using
mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the within-subjects
factor of Block (block 1, block 2) and the between subjects factors
Stress (low, high) and Baseline Negative Affect (high, low). Partici-
pants were grouped into either the high mood group (M = 26.74,
SD = 4.07) or low mood group (M = 15.91, SD = 3.45) using a
median-split technique on the PANAS-X negative subscale scores
(x˜ = 21.7). All analyses were performed with negative affect
included as a continuous variable. Because the results and sig-
niﬁcance of ﬁndings were not affected, we report median-split
analyses only. In addition to our omnibus analyses, we conducted
a small number of directional planned comparisons, focusing on
high versus low negative mood participants in the high-stress
condition in block 1 data. These planned comparisons were
based on a priori predictions of greater stress-mediated disrup-
tion to focused performance in high negative affect participants
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FIGURE 1 | Mean data for Experiment 1, separated by stress
manipulation, negative mood group, and block. Data are shown for
RTCV (reaction time coefﬁcient of variability, calculated as reaction time
standard deviation divided by the mean), error (proportion of commission
errors on no-go trials), and proportion of probe trials reporting off-task
thought. Error bars represent standard errors.
that are likely to diminish over time. Mean data are shown in
Figure 1.
Response time variability
A strong main effect of block was observed, with response
time variability increasing across blocks for all conditions,
F(1,120) = 24.648, p < 0.001. A main effect of stress,
F(1,120) = 5.030, p < 0.05 and a main effect of negative
mood was observed, F(1,120) = 6.307, p < 0.05. A signiﬁcant
interaction between negative mood and stress were observed,
F(1,120) = 4.093, p < 0.05, with the high negative mood group
more likely to engage in variable response time behavior rela-
tive to the low mood group during the high-stress condition,
F(1,50) = 6.964, p < 0.05, but not for the low stress condition,
F(1,50) = 0.204, p = ns. These ﬁndings support the observa-
tion that while both high-stress and high pre-existing negative
mood produced more variable response behavior, the degree to
which stress inﬂuenced response behavior was dependent on par-
ticipants’ level of negative mood. A reliable interaction was also
observed between block and negative mood, F(1,120) = 5.465,
p < 0.05, with the high mood group exhibiting a more variable
response behavior relative to the low mood group during the ﬁrst
experimental block, t(122) = 3.323, p < 0.01, but not the second,
t(122) = 0.238, p = ns. The block by stress interaction did not
reach signiﬁcance, F(1,120) = 2.498, p = ns, nor did the three-way
interaction, F(1,120) = 2.669, p = ns.
Considering our a priori expectation that stress effects should
be maximal immediately following stress induction, we examined
data from just our ﬁrst experimental block. In the high-stress
experimental group, high negative mood participants were signif-
icantly more likely to engage in more variable response behavior
relative to low negative mood participants during the ﬁrst exper-
imental block, t(49) = 2.680, p < 0.01, one-tailed. High negative
mood participants were also more likely to demonstrate a variable
response time relative to the low negative mood group in the low
stress condition, t(71) = 2.178, p < 0.05, one-tailed.
Error rate
In contrast to response time variability, there was no main effect
of block on error rate data, F(1,120) = 0.776, p = ns, no main
effect of stress, F(1,120) = 0.005, p = ns, and no main effect
of negative affect, F(1,120) = 1.626, p = ns. Error rates were
relatively larger for high-stress versus control participants in the
ﬁrst block, but more comparable in the second block, supported
by the interaction of blockwith stress condition, F(1,120)= 5.786,
p< 0.05. Similarly, error rates were relatively larger for high versus
low negative affect groups in the ﬁrst block, F(1,50) = 3.901,
p = 0.054, but comparable in the second block, F(1,50) = 1.540,
p = ns, supported by the interaction of block with negative affect,
F(1,120)= 5.379, p< 0.05. The stress by negative affect interaction
was not signiﬁcant, F(1,120) = 2.410, p = ns, and there was no
three-way interaction, F(1,120) = 0.725, p = ns.
Planned comparisons showed that in congruencewith response
time variability, in the high-stress experimental group, high neg-
ative mood participants were signiﬁcantly more likely to make
errors relative to low negative mood participants during the ﬁrst
experimental block, t(49) = 1.966, p < 0.05, one-tailed. This
effect of negative mood failed to reach signiﬁcance in the low
stress group, t(71) = 1.265, p = ns, one-tailed.
Self-report of off-task thought
As the subjective counterpart to the behavioral measures of task
inattention, self-report probes provide the opportunity for online
experience sampling throughout task performance (Smallwood
and Schooler, 2006). Effects on self-report data were less robust
than for behavioral dependent measures. There was a strong main
effect of block, with all conditions showing greater proportions
of reported off-task thought over blocks, F(1,120) = 13.917,
p < 0.001. The main effect of stress, F(1,120) = 2.289, p = ns,
the main effect of negative mood, F(1,120) = 0.623, p = ns, and
the interaction between these two factors failed to reach signiﬁ-
cance, F(1,120) = 1.156, p = ns. There were also no signiﬁcant
interactions of stress and block, F(1,120) = 0.869, p = ns, negative
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mood and block, F(1,120) = 1.533, p = ns, and no three-way
interaction, F(1,120) = 1.715, p = ns.
Planned comparisons of block 1 data for proportion of off-task
thought did not show a difference for high versus low negative
mood participants in the high-stress condition, t(49) = 0.906,
p = ns, one-tailed.
Retrospective report of thought content
The next series of analyses were designed to investigate the content
of participants’ mind-wandering episodes between high and low
negative mood participants assigned to the high-stress condition.
Retrospective thought content was analyzed using a Chi-square
Test of Independence on the factors Negative Mood (low, high) as
well as Tense (past, present, or future), Valence (positive, neg-
ative, or neutral), and Focus (task-related, TSST-related, and
task-unrelated) during the ﬁrst and second experimental block.
Descriptive statistics for the ﬁrst experimental block are shown in
Table 1.
During the ﬁrst block, negative mood was signiﬁcantly related
to Focus, χ2(2) = 6.190, p < 0.05, Cramer’s V = 0.404, with
the high negative mood group more likely to entertain thoughts
about the TSST and the low mood group more likely to enter-
tain thoughts relating to task performance. The effect of negative
mood on retrospective report failed to reach signiﬁcance for Tense,
χ2(2) = 1.035, p = ns, V = 0.165, and with participants only
reporting either neutral or negative thoughts, Valence also failed
to reach signiﬁcance, χ2(1) = 2.459, p = ns, V = 0.254. Group
differences failed to reach signiﬁcance for Focus χ2(2) = 2.46,
p = ns, or the remaining factors during the second experimental
block (χ2 < 1).
DISCUSSION
Findings suggest that for those who are in a negative mood, acute
stress activates an emotion-focused coping strategy that fosters an
inattentive state (variable response time and a boost in error rates)
relative to those in the low negative mood group. Consistent with
predictions, the observed effects were prominent during the ﬁrst
experimental block only.
The aim of Experiment 1 was to provide evidence for a
cognitive-adaptive transactional account of stress on mind-
wandering behavior. The present ﬁndings are compatible with
such an account, with acute stress inducing a temporary stressor-
oriented bias in attentional allocation relative to the low stress
group, with performance deﬁcits potentiated by the degree of neg-
ative mood reported prior to stress induction. To complement the
cognitive-adaptive ﬁndings in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 was
designed to provide evidence for a bio-cognitive account of stress
on mind-wandering behavior.
EXPERIMENT 2
Bio-cognitive transactions are mechanisms that are modulated by
the ﬂuctuation in both neural and cognitive architectures that
inﬂuence availability of resources. Pupil dilation has been shown
to reliably reﬂect resource utilization during cognitively demand-
ing tasks regardless of the sensory domain under investigation
(Beatty, 1982), with dilation systematically increasing as a func-
tion of cognitive load (Granholm et al., 1996; for a review, see
Kahneman, 1973; Beatty, 1982). Experiment 2 was designed to
replicate the behavioral and self-report trends observed during
Experiment 1, while providing a psychophysiological measure of
resource availability compatible with a bio-cognitive transactional
theory of stress.
The ﬁrst set of analyses were conducted to replicate the stress
effects observed in Experiment 1, and investigate how the observed
trends extended into a third experimental block. It was hypoth-
esized that behavioral trends and retrospective reports would
replicate the ﬁndings observed in Experiment 1, predicting that
participants that report a high level of negative mood will be more
likely to engage in mind-wandering behavior (high response time
variability and error rates) in the high-stress condition relative to
Table 1 | Percentage of retrospective reports for each factor during the first experimental block, for both the low and high negative mood
groups, across Experiments 1 and 2.
Factor Level Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Low negative mood High negative mood Low negative mood High negative mood
Tense Past 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.30
Present 0.60 0 50 0.58 0.50
Future 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.20
Other 0.35 0.39 0.01 0.00
Valence Positive 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Neutral 0.95 0.78 0.50 0.40
Negative 0.05 0.22 0.33 0.60
Other 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00
Focus Task-related 0.40 0.05 0.00 0.00
Stressor-oriented 0.00 0.28 0.33 0.70
Task-unrelated 0.60 0.67 0.25 0.30
Other 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00
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the low negative mood group, with maximal effects likely during
the ﬁrst experimental block. As per Experiment 1, we predict that
task disengagement in the high negative mood group is due to the
initiation of an emotion-focused coping strategy, and therefore
expect that this group will also be more likely engage in rumina-
tory processing of the stressor when compared to the low negative
mood group. In light of previous reports of reduced resource avail-
ability during episodes of stress in thosewith a negative disposition
(Coyne et al., 1981; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984), we predict that
individuals in the high negative mood group will also demonstrate
a larger pupil diameter immediately following stress induction rel-
ative to the low negative mood group, a trend that would parallel
the behavioral indicators of mind-wandering behavior observed
during the ﬁrst experiment. As per Experiment 1, correlations
between dependent measures for the ﬁrst experimental block and
across all experimental blocks are shown in Table 2.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants (n = 47; 23 in the experimental group, 13 females;
and 24 in the control group, 15 females) were undergraduate stu-
dents fromMcMasterUniversity. Participants were recruited using
the University’s online experiment scheduling system and received
partial course credit in exchange for their participation.
Procedure
The experimental procedure was the same as Experiment 1. Par-
ticipants completed the PANAS-X as a measure of baseline mood
and were randomly assigned to either the control or experimental
version of the TSST, and then completed the SART.While our pre-
dictions are exclusively focused on the ﬁrst experimental block,
we included a third block to provide a measure of group dif-
ferences over a longer period of time. Participants were shown
three blocks of 179 stimuli, with a 2000-ms inter-stimulus inter-
val. Pupil diameter was measured using participants’ right eye
using a head-mounted EyeLink II video eye tracking system (SR
Research). Pupil diameter was sampled at 250 Hz continuously
throughout SART performance, and the average pupil diameter
within each trial was recorded, and then averaged across trials to
provide a mean pupil diameter per block.
RESULTS
Behavioral, experience sampling, and pupillometric data were
analyzed using a mixed ANOVA on the within-subjects factor
Block (block 1, block 2, block 3) and the between subjects fac-
tors Stress (high, low) and Negative Mood (low, high). As per
Experiment 1, participants were grouped into either the high
mood group (M = 24.44, SD = 2.91) or low mood group
(M = 16.37, SD = 2.79) using a median-split analysis (x˜ = 19.4).
As per Experiment 1, analyses with negative affect as a con-
tinuous variable yielded the same signiﬁcance of results, and
therefore median-split analyses are reported only. As in Exper-
iment 1, in addition to our omnibus analyses, we conducted a
small number of directional planned comparisons, focusing on
high versus low negative mood participants in the high-stress
condition in block 1 data. These planned comparisons were
based on a priori predictions of greater stress-mediated disrup-
tion to focused performance in high negative affect participants
that are likely to diminish over time. Mean data are shown in
Figure 2.
Response time variability
Response time coefﬁcient of variability was observed to increase
over blocks for all conditions, supported by a strong main effect
of block, F(2,86) = 28.055, p < 0.001. While RTCV scores
were numerically largest for high negative affect participants in
the high-stress group in all blocks, there was no main effect of
stress, F(1,43) = 0.234, p = ns, no main effect of negative affect,
F(1,43) = 0.903, p = ns, and no signiﬁcant interaction between
these two factors, F(1,43) = 2.364, p = ns. None of these effects
interacted with block, all Fs< 1.5.
Planned comparisons of block 1 data suggested that in the
high-stress group, high negative mood participants showed more
variable response behavior compared to low negative mood par-
ticipants, t(20) = 2.369, p < 0.05, one-tailed, congruent with the
pattern of data observed in Experiment 1. This effect of mood was
Table 2 | Correlations Between SART-Dependent Measures During Block 1 AndAcrossTask Performance, For Both Experiments 1 And 2.
Dependent Measure Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Rtcv Error Rate Self-Report Of
Off-TaskThought
Rtcv Error Rate Self-Report Of
Off-TaskThought
Performance During
Block 1
Rtcv – 0.367* 0.062 – 0.480* 0.136
Error Rate 0.367* – 0.101 0.480* – 0.453*
Self-Report Of Off-Task Thought 0.062 0.101 – 0.136 0.453* –
Performance Across
All Task Blocks
Rtcv – 0.409* 0.133* – 0.543* 0.109
Error Rate 0.409* – 0.048 0.543* – 0.497*
Self-Report Of Off-Task Thought 0.133* 0.048 – 0.109 0.497* –
*p < 0.05.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean data for Experiment 2, separated by stress
manipulation, negative mood group, and block. Data are shown for
RTCV (reaction time coefﬁcient of variability, calculated as reaction time
standard deviation divided by the mean), error (proportion of commission
errors on no-go trials), proportion of probe trials reporting off-task thought,
and pupil diameter. Error bars represent standard errors.
not observed for participants in the low stress group, t(23)= 0.882,
p = ns, one-tailed.
Error rate
Error rate was also observed to increase over blocks for all con-
ditions, with a strong main effect of block, F(2,86) = 32.436,
p < 0.001. In the ﬁrst block, error scores appeared to be substan-
tially larger for high negative affect participants in the high-stress
condition compared to other groups. This difference appeared to
diminish across subsequent blocks, with participants in each con-
dition equally likely to make errors over time, with some apparent
sparing of performance (relatively fewer errors) in the low neg-
ative affect, low stress group in the last block. This pattern of
data was supported by a signiﬁcant main effect of negative affect,
F(1,43) = 4.215, p< 0.05, and the three-way interaction of stress,
negative affect, and block, F(2,86) = 4.444, p < 0.05. No other
effects were signiﬁcant, Fs< 0.7.
Planned comparisons of error data in block 1 demonstrate
a higher error rate during task performance for high versus
low negative mood participants in the high-stress condition,
t(20) = 2.012, p < 0.05, one-tailed. This effect of mood was
not observed for the low stress condition, t(23) = 0.384, p = ns,
one-tailed.
Self-report of mind wandering
In contrast to the general pattern of performance over time, and to
self-report of mindwandering in Experiment 1, proportion of self-
report of mind-wandering episodes in Experiment 2 was observed
to generally increase over blocks, F(2,86) = 7.945, p < 0.01, with
a strong linear trend, F(1,43) = 9.056, p < 0.01. Compared to
this general increase in mind wandering over blocks observed
in most conditions, the high stress, high negative mood con-
dition appeared relatively consistent over blocks. This pattern
of data was partially supported by a marginal three-way inter-
action of stress, negative mood and block, F(2,86) = 2.417,
p = ns. Also in contrast to other dependent measures, self-
report of mind wandering was observed to be more frequent
in high negative mood participants compared to low negative
mood participants in this Experiment, F(1,43) = 6.754, p < 0.05.
The interaction of stress and negative mood was not signiﬁ-
cant, F(1,43) = 1.664, p = ns, with no other effects observed,
Fs< 0.6.
Planned comparisons of high versus low negative mood partic-
ipants in block 1 data were not signiﬁcant, with mean differences
opposite to those predicted for both high stress, t(20) = −1.247,
p = ns, and low stress groups, t(23) = −2.616, p = ns.
Pupil dilation
Pupil diameter was observed to vary across block, with overall
larger mean diameters in block 2 compared with block 1 and
block 3, F(2,86) = 8.236, p< 0.01, with no signiﬁcant linear trend,
F(1,43) = 0.225, p = ns. Main effects of stress, F(1,43) = 2.682,
p = ns, and negative mood, F(1,43) = 0.159, p = ns, were
not signiﬁcant. A signiﬁcant interaction of stress and negative
mood supported the observation of larger pupil diameters in high
versus low negative mood participants in the high-stress condi-
tion, but the opposite of this pattern in the low stress condition,
F(1,43)= 8.291, p< 0.01. This pattern of data appeared consistent
over blocks, with no interaction of block by stress, F(2,86)= 1.678,
p = ns, and no other effects, Fs< 0.7.
Planned comparisons of block 1 data showed that in the
high-stress group, high negative mood participants had larger
pupil diameters compared to low negative mood participants,
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t(20) = 2.065, p < 0.05, one-tailed. This pattern was the
opposite to predicted for the low stress group, with larger pupil
diameters larger for low versus high negative affect participants,
t(23) = −2.162, p < 0.5.
Retrospective report of thought content
The next series of analyses investigate whether the content of par-
ticipants’ mind-wandering episodes differs between high and low
negative mood participants in the high-stress condition, during
the ﬁrst experimental block. Descriptive statistics for the ﬁrst
experimental block are shown in Table 1. As per Experiment 1, ret-
rospective thought contentwas analyzed using aChi-square Test of
Independence on the factors Negative Mood (low, high) as well as
Tense (past, present, or future),Valence (positive, negative, or neu-
tral), and Focus (task-related, TSST-related, and task-unrelated).
The high mood group were more likely to entertain thoughts
about the TSST relative to the low mood group, however, the
trend just failed to reach signiﬁcance, χ2(2) = 5.683, p = 0.058,
V = 0.508. The effect of negative mood on retrospective report
failed to reach signiﬁcance for Tense, χ2(2) = 1.833, p = ns,
V = 0.289, or Valence, χ2(2) = 2.640, p = ns, V = 0.346. Group
differences failed to reach signiﬁcance for the remaining factors
(χ2 < 3).
DISCUSSION
The goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate the trends observed
in Experiment 1, with the inclusion of pupillometric evidence of
resource availability, to develop a bio-cognitive account of stress
on mind-wandering behavior. When exposed to our high-stress
manipulation, participants in the high negative mood group dis-
played more variable response behavior and made more errors
compared to participants with low negative mood, and showed
relatively stable versus decreasing patterns of self-report mind
wandering compared to other participants over time. These par-
ticipants also exhibited larger pupil dilation on average relative
to controls. These effects of mood were relatively absent in the
low stress group, providing evidence for resource dependent,
bio-cognitive account of stress on mind-wandering behavior.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current work aims to investigate the effects of stress on
mind-wandering behavior within both the cognitive-adaptive
(Experiment 1) and bio-cognitive (Experiment 2) components
of transactional theory. Participants were grouped based on their
level of negativemood prior to experiment participation, andwere
randomly assigned to either the high stress or low stress version of
the TSST. Participants were then required to complete the SART
as a measure of mind-wandering propensity. With the current
work representing the ﬁrst investigation of stress effects on mind-
wandering behavior, Experiment 1 was exploratory in nature with
the minimal prediction that negative mood would potentiate the
effects of stress. Predictions in Experiment 2 were bolstered by the
trends observed in Experiment 1.
The cognitive-adaptive component of transactional theory pre-
dicts cognitive performance based on resource allocation (coping
strategy)while the bio-cognitive component predicts performance
based on resource availability. When both components are used
in conjunction, transactional theory provides a comprehensive
understanding of stress effects on cognition. Findings from Exper-
iment 1 reveal that participants in the high negative mood group
are more likely to disengage from the task (indicated by an
increased response time variability and error rate) and think about
the stressor when exposed to the high-stress condition relative
to the low negative mood group. This stressor-oriented focus,
reﬂecting an emotion-focused coping strategy, was observed dur-
ing the ﬁrst experimental block only and failed to replicate in
the low stress condition, suggesting that the inattentive state
observed was driven by the stress manipulation. This behav-
ioral trend was observed in both experiments. Findings from
Experiment 2 further reveal that participants in the high negative
mood, high-stress condition also demonstrated reduced resource
availability (larger pupil diameter) during the ﬁrst block rela-
tive to the low negative mood group. Stress-induced limitations
in resource availability promote the select processing of infor-
mation that is most relevant to the self (Wells and Matthews,
1994; Chajut and Algom, 2003; Kofman et al., 2006). These data
therefore suggest that acute stress limits resource availability in
individuals with a negative disposition and, in the initiation of
an emotion-focused coping strategy, promotes the select pro-
cessing of stressor-oriented information at the expense of task
performance.
Previous work on the relation between attentional state and
pupil diameter support this interpretation, with pupillary con-
struction associated with indices of task engagement and dila-
tion with indices of task disengagement (Gilzenrat et al., 2010).
Smallwood et al. (2011a) provide additional evidence for the
systematic relationship between pupil diameter and atten-
tional state using the SART, reporting pupillary dilation during
mind-wandering episodes and constriction during task focus.
Pupil dilation also reﬂects activation of the Locus Coeruleus-
Norepinephrine (LC/NE) system (Yoshitomi et al., 1985; Koss,
1986; Loewenfeld, 1993; Frith and Frith, 2006). The LC/NE system
is a prominent network within the hypothalamic–pituitary–
adrenal axis (HPAA), a constellation of regions activated in
stressful situations that operates to maintain homeostasis within
the body (e.g., Woodward et al., 1991; Morilak et al., 2005). Acute
stress has been shown to induce a phasic release of norepinephrine
(NE) from the LC/NE system (e.g., Abercrombie and Jacobs,
1987a,b; Svensson, 1987; Cecchi et al., 2002a,b). In the attention
literature, phasic release of NE enhances the processing of stim-
uli deemed to be of high reward and utility (Aston-Jones and
Cohen, 2005). Previous work suggests that those in a depres-
sive state are more likely to ruminate relative to healthy controls
(for a review, see Salguero et al., 2012). Depressive rumina-
tion is intrusive and persistent (Lam et al., 2003; Wenzlaff and
Luxton, 2003), and is often ﬁxated on a social problem per-
ceived by the individual to be severe (Edwards and Weary, 1993;
Lyubomirsky et al., 1999; Treynor et al., 2003; Rudolph and Con-
ley, 2005). In the face of a psychosocial stressor such as the
TSST, it is possible that participants in a negative mood, who
typically employ an emotion-focused coping strategy (Coyne
et al., 1981; Parker and Brown, 1982), appraise stressor-focused
thoughts to be of higher utility than the post-stressor SART
and that phasic release of NE potentiates the internal focus of
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attention. As the HPAA feedback mechanisms terminate the stress
response and phasic release of NE begins to diminish (Cham-
berlain et al., 2006), performance of participants with high levels
of negative mood align with the low negative mood group and
low stress controls. A stress-based mind-wandering paradigm
therefore not only offers a unique framework for investigating
the neurochemical basis of mind-wandering behavior, but may
also provide a framework for investigating how depressive pop-
ulations value information in situations of limited processing
capacity.
Regardless of stress induction, depressive populations typically
mind wander more than healthy controls (Smallwood et al., 2007,
2009; Smallwood and O’Connor, 2011). It would therefore be rea-
sonable to predict that in the low stress condition, participants
reporting a high level of negative mood would demonstrate a
heightened propensity to mind wander relative to the low mood
group. Instead, participants in the low negative mood group were
more likely to mind wander (higher response time variability and
errors rates) and have limited resource availability (larger pupil
diameter) in the low stress condition, although this trend did fail
to reach signiﬁcance for all dependent measures. This trend val-
idates the current interpretation that mood interacts with stress
to promote mind-wandering behavior, but raises the question
of why participants with low negative mood would mind wan-
der more than high negative mood participants in circumstances
of low stress. One possibility could be that the low stress con-
dition induces a positive state in those with a depressive mood.
Fredrickson and Levenson (1998) and Fredrickson et al. (1999)
argue that positive mood can regulate negative mood, with posi-
tive mood having been linked to a broadened scope of attention
and heightened resource availability (for a review, see Fredrickson,
1998). Eliciting positive emotions has even been shown to undo
the effects of negativemood (Cabanac, 1971; Solomon,1980; Nezu
et al., 1988). In the low stress condition used in the current work,
participants are asked to spend 5min talking about a favorite expe-
rience or movie. While speculative, it is possible that the low stress
condition temporarily alleviates depressivemood andpromotes an
on-task focus in high negative mood participants. Stress-related
research typically utilizes the high-stress version of the TSST, and
transactional models typically focus on the interaction between
high-stress situations and mood. Findings in the current work
therefore offer a new route of investigation within the stress lit-
erature: does the low stress version of the TSST (engaging in
positive thought) induce a focused state of attention in depressive
populations?
While the low stress condition may elicit positive moods in
participants with high negative mood, Schoofs et al. (2008) found
that exposure to the high-stress version of the TSST can induce a
negative mood in participants. The current work fails to include
measures of TSST effectiveness beyond behavioral measures, and
therefore it could be argued that the observed effects are an
artifact of temporary mood induction. Indeed, the behavioral
deﬁcits observed during the ﬁrst block are congruent with pre-
vious reports of attentional deﬁcits following negative mood
induction (Smallwood and O’Connor, 2011). The inclusion of
a post-TSST mood questionnaire or retrospective report of stres-
sor effectiveness would alleviate the current limitation. However,
in the interest to investigate the depleting effect of stress on task
inattention, increasing the time interval between the TSST and
task performance was perceived as a threat to the validity of data
interpretation. In addition to the passage of time, it is possible
that having participants actively reﬂect on their currentmoodmay
interfere with the stress manipulation. Investigating the mediating
role of stress-induced mood on cognition, rather than the mediat-
ing role of moodon stress effects (as in the currentwork),would be
an interesting route of investigation andmay help shed light on the
mechanisms underlying the effect of stress on mind wandering.
Introducing a time interval between the TSST and SART per-
formance may also inﬂuence the degree to which participants
are likely to report of mind wandering during the ﬁrst experi-
mental block. In the current work, the high and low negative
mood groups were equally likely to report off-task thought in the
high-stress condition, even though behavioral measures of task
inattention appear to differ between groups. One reason for this
ﬁnding could be stereotype threat induced by the TSST. Stereotype
threat refers to the psychosocial phenomena whereby an individ-
ual feels under threat of a stigmatized social identity (Steele and
Aronson, 1995; Steele, 1997), with the individual maintaining an
effort to sustain a self-image of competence beyond race, gender,
socioeconomic status, or age (Steele, 1988; Aronson et al., 1999).
The TSST is designed to stimulate a manageable level of stress
through social evaluative threat and perceived uncontrollability
(Kirschbaum et al., 1993), providing the ideal environmental con-
text for facilitation of stereotype threat. In light of evidence that
stereotype threat facilitates worries related to perceived task per-
formance (Cadinu et al., 2005; Beilock et al., 2007), it is reasonable
to presume that participants were likely to diminish the degree
to which they reported mind-wandering behavior in the high-
stress condition, regardless of negative mood. This interpretation
is also congruent with previous reports that self-report measures
are vulnerable to threats of performance evaluation (Vinski and
Watter, 2012), and the failure to observe consistent correlations
between self-report and the remaining dependent measures across
both experiments. Future research on the effects of stress using
the mind-wandering paradigm might beneﬁt from measuring the
degree to which participants felt intimidated by the high-stress
condition of the TSST as a mediator of self-report measures.
The current ﬁndings are interpreted with a focus on the detri-
mental effects of stress on participants that report a high level
of negative mood. However, an alternative interpretation could
be that low levels of negative mood buffers against the detrimen-
tal effects of stress, resulting in enhanced task-focus immediately
following stress induction. This interpretation is congruent with
previous stress-related work in non-depressive populations that
demonstrates improved vigilance at moderate levels of arousal
(for a review, see Warm et al., 2008). This interpretation would
also account for the steady decline in vigilance (and increase in
mind wandering frequency) as the effects of stress diminish over
time. However, participants with low levels of negative mood were
equally likely to engage in mind-wandering behavior regardless of
the stress condition across all experimental blocks, and mind wan-
dering typically increases throughout task duration regardless of
participants’mood due to a decline in available cognitive resources
necessary to maintain stimulus-independent thought (Teasdale
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et al., 1995). The current experiments do not permit the ability
to tease apart whether the temporary low levels of mind wander-
ing observed in the low negative mood, high-stress condition is
due to the effects of stress or due to a natural task-oriented focus
of attention at the early stages of experiment participation typi-
cally observed in non-depressive populations, however, this route
of investigation would be interesting in future studies of stress
effects on mind wandering.
While we discuss the current effects within a theoretical frame-
work of attentional control, it is possible that other causal
arrangements could account for the observed effects. For example,
the difference in self-report of on-task performance over blocks
could more causally relate to the differences we observe in behav-
ioral performance measures. Our view is that all of these measures
reﬂect aspects of attentional control, but concede that it is not
possible from our data to properly tease apart potentially separate
effects of block and more basic attentional effects.
While a priori predictions were replicated between the two
experiments, it is imperative to consider the ﬁndings that failed to
replicate, including the main effects of stress and negative mood.
One possibility for the discrepant ﬁndings could be the difference
in sample size: Experiment 1 has a sample size almost twice the size
of Experiment 2. It is therefore entirely plausible that the power
of the observed effects in Experiment 1 is not large enough to
translate into a smaller sample. It is also plausible that including
an eye-tracker in Experiment 2 introduced a degree of discom-
fort for participants, which may have diminished the difference in
mind-wandering behavior originally observed between groups in
Experiment 1.
In summary, ﬁndings in the current work provide evidence
for a transactional account of stress on mind-wandering behavior.
Speciﬁcally, acute stress appears to limit the availability of cognitive
resources in participants that report a high level of negative mood
(Experiment 2) and, in the alongside the initiation of an emotion-
focused coping strategy, is likely to induce a temporary stressor-
oriented focus of attention at the expense of task performance
(Experiment 1).
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